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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in failing to grant the

defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during an
improper parole search?
2.

Did the trial court err in denying the defendant's

motion to exclude cummulative other crimes evidence?
3.

Did the trial court err by giving the jury an

instruction which contained a mandatory rebuttable presumption?

IV

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
Case No. 20814

PATRICK D. JOHNSON,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment against Patrick D.
Johnson for Burglary, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended), and Forgery, a Second
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 (1953 as
amended).

A jury found him guilty following a trial on May 29-30,

1985 in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge,
presiding.

He was sentenced to the indeterminate terms of not

more than five years for Burglary, and one to fifteen years for
the Forgery, the sentences to run consecutively at the Utah State
Prison beginning July 1, 198 5.
Statement of Facts
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed three motions:
1)

a motion to sever seven counts of forgery from one count of

burglary and one count of forgery alleged in the information;

2)

a motion to suppress evidence obtained during an improper

parole search of the defendant's residence; and 3)

a motion to

exclude from trial the other crimes testimony of one cf the
State's witnesses (R.10,13,25)•

(Addendum A)

The court granted

the first motion but denied the other two (R.10,26,144,164).
(Addendum B)
During trial, and at•the hearing on the motion to suppress,
the following facts were adduced.

At approximately 10:00 a.m. on

February 2, 1985 Harry Deckert, Pastor of the Four Square Church
located at 1068 Jefferson Street, discovered that his church had
been broken into and that a tape recorder was missing from the
premises (T.14-19).

On further investigation, Pastor Decket found

what appeared to be blood stains on two shattered windows, on the
floor of the church and on the door handle of the church's main
door (T.18).

It was stipulated at trial that police officer Tom

Olsen responded to Mr. Deckert's report of the burglary; Officer
Olsen investigated the scene and concluded that none of the surfaces inside or outside the church could be processed for fingerprints (T.27).

No blood samples were taken into evidence (T.27).

No one was seen in or around the church by either Pastor Deckert
or Officer Olsen (T.17).
After the police investigation, Pastor Deckert found that
two groups of checks were missing from two different Four Square
Church checkbooks kept in his office desk (T.19).

Thirty-five

checks, numbered 1175-1210, were missing from the "light-blue"
church checking account, and 86 checks, numbered 2444-2530, were
-2-

missing from the other set of checks colored "yellow" (T.19).
Two Statefs exhibits S-l (a blue Four Square Church check, No.
1180) and S-10 (a yellow church check, No. 2246[sic]) were
identified by Mr. Deckert as two of the missing checks; Pastor
Deckert testified that he had not issued the checks and that he
had not given anyone authority to handle or issue the checks on
behalf of Four Square Church (T.21).

Pastor Deckert further

testified that he did not know anyone named Cary Montoya or
Gary G. Montoya (T.21).
At approximately 6:00 p.m. on February 2, 1985, Four
Square Church check No. 1180 was cashed at Macey 1 s supermarket
located on 1406 West 10th North.

Lynn Cevering, a Macey f s employee,

testified that he cashed the check for a black male who represented
himself as Cary Montoya (T.32).

According to Mr. Cevering, the

individual claiming to be Cary Montoya presented two forms of
identification—neither I.D. displayed a picture—and endorsed the
check in Mr. Ceveringfs presence (T.31).

On February 12th a police

detective showed Mr. Cevering a photo spread containing five or six
pictures and asked him to pick out the individual who had endorsed
the Four Square Church check (T.33).

Mr. Cevering selected the

appellant's Patrick Johnson's, picture and wrote on the back of it
that he was "70 percent" certain this was the individual who had
endorsed check No. 1180 (T.35).

However, on April 29, at a

physical lineup which took place at the Metropolitan Hall of
Justice, Mr. Cevering was unable to identify Patrick Johnson as
the individual who had claimed to be Cary Montoya back on
-3-

February 2 (T.37).

In fact, Mr. Cevering indicated on his lineup

instruction card that he "felt" someone other than the defendant
was posibly the individual who had endorsed the check (T.37-38).
Over defense counsel's numerous objections (including
the denied 404(b) motion to exclude other crimes evidence), Nora
Welch testified for the State.

Ms. Welch, an employee at Stimsonfs

supermarket located at 158 West 600 North, stated that she
accepted a check for groceries and cash written on the account
of Cary Montoya on February 2nd around 4:00 p.m. (T.46-49).

She

testified that she had cashed checks for the individual purporting
to be Cary Montoya on more than one occasion (T.50).

On February

11th, Ms. Welch was shown a photo spread by a police detective
and she positively identified the defendant as being the individual
who cashed the Cary Montoya check (T.52-53).

On March 5th, Ms.

Welch selected the appellant from an eight-man lineup at the
Metropolitan Hall of Justice, again, as being the individual who
cashed the Cary Montoya check (T.55).

Ms. Welch also testified

that she told a police officer, sometime after February 2nd but
before February 11th, that the individual who presented himself
as Cary Montoya on February 2nd had a "mustache and a little
beard" (T.62).

In neither the photos, nor in the lineup did the

defendant have a mustache and little beard.
Cary Montoya testified at trial that he had not signed
the February 2nd check, that he had given no one the authority
to do so and that the last time he had seen his checkbook on
November 17, 1984, it was in the hands of his landlady (T.64-67).
-4-

In November of 1984 Mr, Montoya's landlady evicted him; she
claimed she would turn his checkbook over to his bank but she
apparently never did (T.66).
At trial, police crime lab technician, Steve Rowley,
made a detailed comparison of the endorsement on the Four Square
Church check and the signature on the check from the account of
Gary Montoya (T.82-98).

Mr. Rowley stated he was 90-95 per cent

sure the two checks had been signed by the same person (T.98).
Salt Lake Detective Kyle Jones testified that he met
with the appellant's two parole officers, John Shepard and Rick
Acevedo, on February 13, 198 5 and informed them that he had
obtained a warrant for the arrest of Patrick Johnson for eight
counts of forgery (R.181).

Detective Jones told Mr. Shepard

and Mr. Acevedo that the forgeries involved the Four Square
Church and Cary Montoya checking accounts (T.197).

Agents Acevedo

and Shepard decided, based on this information and on the suspicion
that the defendant had pawned a stereo on January 9th, that Mr.
Shepard should conduct, a parole search of appellant's premises
(R.192).
On February 14, 1985 the appellant was residing with his
mother, Connie Morashita, at 1861 West 600 North (T.69).

John

Shepard testified at trial, and at the pretrial hearing on the
defense's motion to suppress, that he went to the appellant's
residence around 2:00 p.m. on February 14th accompanied by Salt
Lake City Detectives Kyle Jones and Jim Bell, Sargeant Mike
Roberts and Lieutenant Brent Davis (T.69)(R.183).
-5-

Mr. Shepard

stared that the police went to the residence to arrest the appellant for forgery and that he (Mr. Shepard) went to the appellant's
residence to conduct a parole search based on reasonable
suspicion that the appellant had violated the terms of his parole
(R.192).

The record does not clearly indicate whether the police

asked Mr. Shepard to accompany

them to the residence (R.206,210).

Once Agent Shepard and the police had arrived at the appellant's
residence they remained out of sight while Agent Acevedo phoned
the appellant to make sure he was in the apartment; Mr. Acevedo
then radioed the police and informed them that the appellant was
at home (R.206).

After the four officers and Agent Shepard had

gained entrance to Mrs. Morashita's apartment—with her consent—
the police placed the appellant under arrest (R.203).

Mr.

Shepard then conducted a parole search of the apartment (R.208).
It is unclear whether Mrs. Morishita gave permission for such
a search.

She testified she did not (R.213).

Agent Shepard testified that he was specifically searching
for Four Square Church checks (R.16) and that this is what he
told Mrs. Morashita when he purportedly gained her consent to
search (R.208).
Mr. Shepard found a black binder in the apartment's
front hall closet.

He immediately confiscated the binder and

its contents, terminated his parole search and turned the material
over to the police while still inside the apartment (R.187-189).
The binder contained:

a Four Square Church check, a VISA credit

card receipt signed "Cary Montoya," a VISA credit card receipt
-6-

to the Pawn Shop signed "Gary Montoya," a VISA credit card
receipt to Thrifty Drugs signed "Cary Montoya,11 a Traveler's
Express Purchase receipt signed "Willie Johnson," three photographs of the appellant and a photograph of another man—not
the appellant (T.71-81).
Connie Morashita's stipulated testimony indicated that
her other son, Lonnie Johnson, was also living with her at the
time of the appellant's arrest (T.127).
On the last day of trial, defense counsel took exception
to the court's decision to give the jury a possession of recently
stolen property instruction (T.124).

The jury convicted the

appellant of che offenses of Burglary, a Third Degree Felony
(based on the application of Utah's property recently stolen
statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402 (1953 as amended), and Forgery,
a Second Degree Felony (T.130).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The first argument on appeal is that the trial erred in
failing to suppress evidence obtained during an illegal parole
search of the appellant's residence.

The parole search conducted

by John Shepard, the appellant's parole officer, was instigated
by the police.

Furthermore, the searcn was not conducted pursuant

to Mr. Shepard's duties as a parole agent, but was carried out
for the primary purpose of uncovering evidence with which to
secure burglary and forgery convictions against the appellant.
The second argument on appeal is that the court below
committed reversible error by failing to exclude other crimes
-7-

evidence which was not probative on any issue at trial.

After

granting the appellant's motion to sever various counts of
forgery, the trial court erred by allowing testimony concerning
one of the severed counts into trial.

These graveLy inconsistent

rulings permitted the State to present the jury with nothing more
than cumulative evidence of the appellant's propensity to commit
crime.
The third argument on appeal is that the trial court committed a fundamental error when it read the jury an unconstitutional
"possession of property recently stolen" instruction.

Because

this instruction contained a mandatory rebuttable presumption,
it relieved the State of its burden of proof.

The instruction

severely abridged the appellant's right to be presummed innocent
until proven guilty.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE OBTAINED DURING AN IMPROPER
PAROLE SEARCH.
On the day prior to Patrick Johnson's arrest on eight
counts of forgery, Detective Kyle Jones met with the appellant's
parole officers, John Shepard and Rick Acevedo (R.181).

Detective

Jones informed the two officers of his intent to arrest the
appellant (R.18).

He fully explained the basis for the issuance

of a warrant for the appellant's arrest (R.197), and he indicated
his belief

that certain stolen checks were probably still in the
-8-

appellantfs possession (R.181).

After this meeting, Agents

Shepard and Acevedo decided that one of them should accompany
the arresting police officers to the appellant's residence in
order to determine the nature and extent of Mr. Johnson's parole
violation (R.192).
On the day of the appellantfs arrest, Mr. Shepard and
four police officers gained entry to the appellant!s motherfs
(Mrs. Morashita's) apartment—where the appellant was residing—
via Mrs. Morashitafs consent (R.208).

After the appellant was

arrrested, Mr. Shepard conducted a search of the apartment (R.208;.
In one of the apartmentfs closets

Agent Shepard found a black

binder containing a Four Square Church check and numerous receipts
bearing the signature "Cary Montoya" (R.187).

Mr. Shepard immedi-

ately turned over the binder and its contents to the officers
present in the apartment and terminated his search (R.187-189).
Prior to trial, the appellant made a motion to suppress
the evidence obtained during Agent Shepardfs parole search (R.13).
(Addendum A)

The appellant argued to the court below that the

parole search was not conducted pursuant to Mr. Shepard's proper
duties as a parole officer (R.55-56).

It was, and is, the

appellant's contention that the parole search was carried out for
the purpose of uncovering evidence with which to secure burglary
and forgery convictions against the appellant (R.56).
below denied the motion to suppress (R.237-241).

(Addendum B)

In doing so, the court reasoned:
The state must persuade this court. . .
that the search was reasonably related
-9-

The court

to the parole officer's duty. And I
believe this is the point that is
pressed by counsel for the defendant.
She would argue that becuase it was
obvious that the defendant would already be taken into custody that
there was no further need for the
parole officer to be involved to
see whether or not the defendant
had committed a crime or violated
his parole.
Court is not persuaded by that argument as the court feels that there
are two independent and unrelated
processes which begin. One is not
controlled by the other. When a person
is on parole that parole officer may
investigate independently of officers,
and despite what investigation they
may be doing on new offenses, whether,
in fact, he has broken the parole
agreement. It is this court's duty
and the parole officer's duty to independently review that in an order
to show cause hearing and, therefore,
the court feels that a parole officer
has the right and obligation himself
to gather evidence for that order to
show cause hearing.
The court is persuaded that if there
were evidence that this was not the
good faith effort on the part of the
parole officer to see if there had
been a parole violation or a commission
of a crime, which is a paroie violation,
but rather he was being used as a tool
of the police rathen than them obtaining what they would have to obtain a
search warrant, the court feels the
motion would be well taken. However,
the court has found no evidence of
that in this record and, in fact,
would refer to.the case [State v.
Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983)]
cited by counsel for the defendant
wherein the court feels the facts in
that case were a much worse scenario.
The court cites from page 1257 where it
-10-

states "Voyles told Holm that although
the police did not have probable cause
for a warrant to search Garcia1s apartment, it would be 'beneficial* to the
police if the parole department: would
conduct the search." It seems to me
that that is a much clearer case that
the police were using the parole department as their agents and yet our supreme
court nevertheless upheld the search in
that case (R.239-240).
The appellant contends that the court erred in making this
ruling.

The court's denial of the appellant's motion to suppress

illegally obtained evidence abridged the appellant's Due Process
privacy protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
As indicated in the trial court's ruling, the Utah law
which articulates the standard for determining the propriety of
parole searches is State v. Velasquz, 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983).
Quoting Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 99 S.Ct.
2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed. 2d 484, 494 (1972) in Velasquez this court
found:
In formulating a rule to govern parole
officer searches, consideration must
1
As a threshold inquiry it should be noted that State v.
Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983) (holding that a specific objection
at trial is necessacy to preserve a claim of error where a pretrial
motion to suppress has been denied) does not apply in this case. As
the majority noted, their holding is specifically limited to those
situations where a defendant does not provide the appellate court
with the record of the pretrial hearing so rhat it can review the
pretrial decision. Id., at 82-83. Lesley is also distinguishable
from the present case in that Patrick Johnson's trial did not involve tne Lesley problem where one district court judge heard the
suppression motion and another judge heard the trial.
-11-

be accorded both to "the government
function involved" and to "the private
interest that has been affected by
governmental action."
State v. Velasquez, supra at 1259.
The court stated that the "governmental function involved"
is:
. . . to assist those who have broken
the criminal law to make a controlled
and supervised transition from prison
life—with its intimate and constant
association with a society of lawbreakers and a high degree of regimentation—to a complete reintegration
into society without that kind of
association and regimentation. To
facilitate that transition, an inmate
is permitted parole status subject
to conditions designed to maximize
the potential for a successful reintegration of the parolee by attempting to ward off some of the undesirable influences that may defeat the
purpose of the parole system.
Id. at 1258.
The parolee fs ''private interest" which is to be balanced
against the State's "governmental function" was found to be:
". . . a more narrowly protected privacy interest [than the noncriminal citizen's] designed to facilitate [the parolee's] moving
more quickly from the confinement of prison to a point where his
full panoply of civil liberties is restored."

^Ed. at 1259.

The court concluded that:
In dealing with searches of parolee's,
we agree with those courts that have
adopted what has been called a "middle
ground" approach. In determining what
constitutes permissible searches and
seizures by parole officers, this
-12-

approach, on the one hand, eschews the
position than no constitutional protection should be afforded a parolee, but,
on the other hand, does not require a
warrant based on probable cause. [Citation ommitted.] Thus, although a warrant
based on probable cause is not generally
required, a parole officer must have
reasonable grounds for investigating
whether a parolee has violated the terms
of his parole or committed a crime.
[Citations ommitted.]
Id. at 1260.
The court further concluded that the "reasonable grounds"
standard constituted a two-part test of a parole search's validity:
11

. . . i t means a reasonable suspicion that a parolee has committed

a parole violation or crime.

[Citations ommitted.]

The search,

however, must also be reasonably related to the parole officerfs
duty."

[Emphasis added.]

Id. at 1260.
Applying this two-part test—involving judicial scrutiny
of (1) a parole officer's "reasonable suspicion" that a parole
violation has occurred, and (2) the reasonable relationship
between the parole search and the duties of a parole officer—to
the facts before them, the court in Velasquez denied the defendant's
motion to suppress.

The defendant in Velasquez argued that

because a defective called the parole officer who searched the
defendant's residence and told him "it would be 'beneficial' to
the police if Adult Probation and Parole" would conduct the search,
the probation officer was simply acting as a tool of the police.
Velasquez, supra, at 1262.

Stating that:
-13-

A parole officer's search of a parolee
• . . is not unlawful just because it
is also benefficial to the police, or
because evidence incriminating the
parolee is turned over to the police
and used in a criminal prosecution.
Id. at 1263, the court rejected the defendantfs contention
because "the parole officers had decided that a search should
be undertaken even before Detective Voyles [the police officer]
talked to Dennis Holm [one of the parole officers] . "
1263.

Id., at

(Emphasis added.)
Because the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Velasquez

turns upon the fact that the parole search in that case was not
instigated by the police, the trial court in the present case
seriously skewed the language it quoted from Velasquez (see p.10-11
supra) when it quoted that language out of context.

Since the

court below relied heavily upon this misreading and because there
does

exist evidence in the record that John Shepard acted as a

tool for the police, the court committed serious error when it
denied appellantfs motion to suppress.
The court below concluded that the facts of Velasquez
present a "much worse scenario," i.e., a much clearer indication
of a parole officer being used as a tool of the police, than do
the facts of State v. Patrick Johnson (R.240).

The court based

this conclusion on the fact that a police officer in Velasquez
asked a parole officer to conduct a search for the benefit of
police, while no such request exists in the record of the apellant!s trial (R.240).

The appellant contends, however, that the
-14-

trial court's

emphasis of the importance of this distinction led it

to entirely overlook the critical basis for the holding in Velasquez:
had there been no evidence that the parole officers in that case
intended to search before being asked to by the police, and if the
officers had in fact searched without that autonomous, prior
intent, the court would have found the search illegal.
The record in the present case indicates that John
Shepard and Rick Acevedo had sufficient "reasonable suspicion"
for conducting a parole search other than their concern that trie
appellant had burglarized a church and forged checks (R.198).
However, their principal independent

concerns—that the appellant

had pawned a stereo and may have been using drugs—had not led
them to conduct a search during the month between the report of
the pawning

and the day Detective Jones met with them (R.196).

The record indicates that it was only after Detective Jones met
with the parole agents that the agents decided to conduct the
search (R.200-201).

Furthermore, at the time of the search, John

Shepard explicity stated to Mrs. Morashita that he was searching
for stolen checks, and once the checks had been found Agent
Shepard immediately turned the seized evidence over to the
police and terminated his search (R.187-189).

These facts,

indicating improper complicity between parole agents and police,
should have led the trial court, relying on Velasquez, to conclude that the appellant's constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated.
-15-

The appellant does not argue with the contention that:
The mere fact that [a] police officer was
the first to suspect that [the parolee]
was engaged in criminal activity and
related this to the parole officer—in
no way alters the legality of the parole
officerfs presence [i.e., search].
Velasquez, supra at 1263, nor with the proposition that ". . . t o
minimize the social risks inherent in parole, an acceptable parole
system does necessarily entail a certain degree of close supervision, surveilllance, and control over the parolee."
Simms, 516 P.2d 1088 (Wash. App. 1973).

State v.

Further, the appellant

readily admits:
To evaluate the parolee's progress, and
to assist the parolee from avoiding
further criminal conduct, the parole
officer needs to "have a thorough understanding of the parolee and his environment, including his personal habits, his
relationships with other person, and
what he is doing both at home and outside it."
Velasquez, supra, at 1259.

However, a trial court cannot ignore

the dictates of due process which require:

". . .[that] under

no circumstances should cooperation between law enforcement
officers and proba-cion officers be permitted to make the probation
system, a subterfuge for criminal investigations."

United States

v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 267 (9th Cir. 1975), and:
". . . [that] searches conducted . . . by a parole officer can be
justified only 'to the extent actually necessitated by the legitimate demands of the operation of the parole process."

Velasquez,

supra, at 1263, quoting Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235 (Ala. 1977).
-16-

As the court in Roman v. State, supra, at 24 2 points out:
It is only the dual mandate of
correctional officers to rehabilitate
their clients and to protect society
that justifies an intrusion into the
privacy of the released offender.
Based on the facts adduced in the trial below, the
appellant contends that the prosecutorial parole search conducted
by Agent Shepard furthered neither the rehabilitation of his
client nor the legitimate protection of society.

Agent Shepard

went into the residence announcing his intent to search for
stolen checks, found the stolen checks and turned them over to
the police.

Such action can hardly be deemed rehabilitation.

Furthermore, the police had the duty to perform a warranted search
once they had probable cause to arrest the appellant.

Clearly,

the police officers in this case could not have searched the
appellant's premises without a search warrant:

as the court below

recognized (R.240), this case did not involve an exception to the
rule that "searches conducted [by police] outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.11

Katz y. United States,

389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 535
(1967).^

This case should be remanded because John Shepardfs

2
As this Court noted in State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 179
(Utah 1983) , exceptions to the warrantless search rule include
consent searches, searches and seizures made in hot pursuit, searcnes
and seizures of contraband in areas lawfully accessible to the public,
seizure of evidence in plain view after lawful intrusion, and
searches and seizures incident to lawful arrest based on probable
cause under exigent circumstances. The present case does not
involve any of these "jealously drawn" exceptions.
-17-

conduct amounted to circumvention of the requirement that police
act pursuant to a warrant.

This is especially true given that

the court in Velasquez, supra at 1260 noted:
We do not address the problem of
whether a warrant must be obtained
when a parolee is living with others
who are not parolees. Caution would
certainly suggest that a warrant be
obtained if the rights of nonparolees might be affected.
In Smith v. Rhay, 419 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1969), it was
held that a parole officer may not constitutionally conduct a
warrantless

search of items in a parolee's possession while act-

ing on the prior request of law enforcement officials and in
concert with them.

In Rhay, upon being informed by the sheriff

that a burglary had occurred in the shop in which the parolee's
wife worked, the parole officer accompanied a deputy sheriff to
find the parolee.

The parolee was apprehended in a restaurant

and the trio went to the parolee's hotel room, where in plain
sight the officers saw a major portion of the items taken from
the shop.

The parolee was convicted of burglary and sought habeas

corpus relief, which was denied by the Federal District Court,
and the parolee appealed.

Finding that the parole officer was

acting as an agent of the police, and deciding that the items
had been unconstitutionally seized and should not have been
admitted into evidence, the court reversed.

The court said that

where the parole officer was acting on the prior request of law
enforcement officials and in concert with them, he was not acting
as the supervising guardian, so to speak, of the parolee, but
-18-

as the agent of the very authority upon whom the requirement for
a search warrant is constitutionally imposed, and that to permit
concerted effort among officials in an attempt, such as was
manifest in the present case, to circumvent the parolee's
Fourth Amendment rights could not be done.
The appellant in the present case contends that, just
as in Rhay, his parole officer and the police acted in concert
to circumvent the requirement that the police obtain a warrant
to search a parolee's residence.

While the record below does

not explicitly indicate that the police requested Agent Shepard
to conduct a search, the manner in which the search was arranged
and conducted readily gives rise to the inference that such a
request was made.

But even if no request was made, the appellant

would urge this court to send a message to overly compliant, even
if well-meaning, parole officers that they must stay out of the
business of conducting searches in order to supply the police with
evidence of crimes.

Because the appellant's parole officer was

not acting within his prescribed "supervisory" role when he
searched the appellant's residence, the court below should have
excluded the evidence obtained during the search.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
CUMULATIVE OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE.
This appeal is from the conviction of burglary of the
Four Square Church and forgery of a Four Square Church check.
Prior to trial, the appellant made a motion to sever the one count
-19-

of forgery (and one count of burglary) involving the Four Square
Church checking account from the seven counts of forgery involving
the checking account of Cary Montoya (R.10) (Addendum A ) .
trial court granted this motion (R.10) (Addendum B ) .

The

One day

before trial began, defense counsel made a motion, under Rule
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983), to exclude from
trial the proposed testimony of Nora Welch (see p. 4 supra)(R.25).
Ms- Welch's proffer was that the appellant presented himself as
Cary Montoya and cashed a check on the account of Cary Montoya
in a local supermarket on February 2, 1985 (the same day that the
appellant allegedly cashed the Four Square Church check using the
name Cary or Gary Montoya).

The trial court denied the appellant's

motion to exclude this testimony, ruling that it fell within the
"identity" exception to Rule 404(b) (R.164).

In so ruling the

court committed reversible error.
Nora Welch's testimony plainly constitutes other crimes
evidence within the context of the Four Square Church trial.

The

appellant contends that the court's admission of this other crimes
evidence was seriously prejudicial since the evidence was not
probative of a material issue, but was merely cumulative.

Further-

more, by allowing the evidence into trial the court effectively
nullified its ruling granting the appellant's requested severance
of the forgery counts.
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) states:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a
-20-

person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident.
Interpreting Rule 404(b)fs predecessor, Rule 55, Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971) , this Court, in State v. Cauble, 563
P.2d 775, 779 (Utah 1977), held:
The general rule is that in a criminal
case evidence which shows or tends to
show that the defendant had committed
another crime in addition to that for
which he is on trial is inadmissible.
However, an exception to the rule is
that evidence of another crime is admissible when it tends to establish
motive; intent:; absence of mistake or
accident; or to show a common scheme
or plan embracing commission of similar
crimes so related to each other that
the proof of one tends to establish the
crime for which the defendant is on trial.
In State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah 1982) this
Court narrowly confined the admissibility of "common scheme"
other crimes evidence:
Evidence is not admitted merely because it shows a common plan, scheme,
or manner of operation. Instead,
evidence of a common plan, scheme,
or manner of operation is admitted
where it tends to prove some fact
material to the crime charged.
In his concurrence to the Forsyth opinion, Justice
Stewart articulated the spirit in which the court should evaluate
other crimes evidence:
The rule excluding evidence of prior
misconduct to show the character or
-21-

disposition of a defendant was
established not because such evidence was irrelevant, but because
of the likelihood that it would
skew the fact-finding process . . .
Referring to the federal counterpart to Rule 55, 10 Moore Federal
Practice, §404.-21[2] (2nd. Ed.
1981) states: "Admission of other
crimes evidence is not guaranteed
under Rule 404 (b) even if it is
offered for !other purposes. . . f .
The danger of undue prejudice must
be balanced against the probative
value of the evidence in making
this determination."
(Emphasis
added.)
Id. at 1178.
Most recently, in State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583 (Utah 1984),
this Court applied the Forsyth "identity" standard and utilized
Justice Stewart's proposed balancing approach to find that
evidence indicating the defendant committed a robbery while in
possession of a stolen car would not be admissible on the issue
of whether in fact the defendant did have possession of the
car since the issue of identity of the car thief was foreclosed
by other competent evidence.

Admission of the robbery evidence

would have been merely cumulative and therefore unduly prejudicial.
The appellant contends that the Holder test of admissibility readily applies in the present case to indicate that the
testimony of Nora Welch should have been excluded from the trial
below.

Because State's witness Lynn Cevering (see p.3 supra)

was able to say he was "70 percent" certain that the appellant
was the individual who had cashed the Four Square Church check,
the effect of Nora Welch's testimony was merely cumulate rather
-22-

than probative on the issue of identity.

If Mr. Cevering had not

been able to identify the appellant with any degree of certainty
then Ms. Welch ! s testimony would possibly have been admissible:
her testimony increased in probative value in proportion to Mr.
Ceveringfs uncertainty.

But because Mr. Ceveringfs testimony

was substantially probative on the issue of identity, the
State's case, as in the Holder case, could not be furthered in
this essentially "foreclosed" issue by the dangerously prejudicial
other crimes testimony of Ms. Welch.

Applying the balancing

test urged by Justice Stewart, the danger of undue prejudice
in this case outweighed the probative value of the Statefs other
crimes evidence.

Because the probative value of Ms. Welch's

testimony was far outweighed by its threat of prejudice, the jury
below was permitted to consider statements indicating no-ching
other than the appellant's propensity to commit crime.
Even if Ms. Welch's testimony was more probative than
prejudicial, still her testimony should have been excluded by
virtue of the court's severance of the forgery counts.

Presum-

ably, at the time the trial court granted the appellant's motion
to sever the various counts of forgery arising from two separate
criminal episodes, it did so because one trial on all offenses
would have denied the appellant due process of law.

This is

especially true given that the court below found the methods of
forging the Four Square Church and Cary Montoya checks were so
similar as to constitute a "common scheme11 (R.164) . A decision
to sever counts on an information where those counts evidence
-23-

a "common scheme" is not one made lightly by Utah trial judges.
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court will overturn a trial
judgefs failure to sever only upon a substantial showing of
prejudicial harm.

State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1214 (Utah

1984) .
The policies furthered by granting severance of counts
are nearly identical to those advanced when the court excludes
other crimes evidence.

Recognizing judicial economy as the

advantage of joinder of offenses, the Distridt of Columbia Court
of Appeals, in Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir.
1964) noted four disadvantages of joinder:

(1)

the defendant

could become embarrassed or have difficulty in presenting defenses;
(2)

the jury may infer a criminal disposition and thereby prejudice

the defendant; (3)
and (4)

the jury may view the evidence cumulatively;

a prejudicial latent feeling of Hostility may surface.

Given these reasons for severing counts in an information, it is
the appellant's contention -chat severance is useless if evidence
specifically pertaining to separate and severed criminal acts
will be mutually admissible in tne separate trials.

The due

process rights the court protects with one hand it eradicates
with the other.

Therefore, the court below committed a prejudicial

about-face by inconsistently ruling that severance would be
granted while the 404(b) motion would be denied.

For this reason

and because Ms. Welch's testimony constituted cumulative, substantially prejudicial other crimes evidence, the appellant
should be granted a new trial.
-24-

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GIVING THE
JURY AN INSTRUCTION WHICH CONTAINED
A MANDATORY REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION.
on the last day of trial, defense counsel took exception
to the court's proposed "possession of property recently stolen"
instruction (T.124).

Despite this objection the court included

in its jury instructions:
INSTRUCTION NO. 13
A related statute provides that:
"Possession of property recently stolen,
when no satisfactory explanation of
such possession is made, shall be prima
facie evidence that the person in possession stole the property."
Thus, if you find from the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt, (I) that a
defendant was in possession of property,
(II) that the property was stolen in a
burglary, (III) that such possession was
not too remote in point of time from the
burglary, and (IV) that a defendant had
made no satisfactory explanation of such
possession, then you may find from those
facts that such defendant committed the
burglary in which such property was stolen,
and stole the property.
The appellant contends that the lower court committed
reversible error by giving the above instruction because it
unconstitutionally relieved the State of its burden of proof
and improperly shifted a burden of proving innocence onto the
defendant.
This Court's recent holdings in State v. Chambers, 709
P.2d 321 (Utah 1985) and State v. Pacheco, 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 18
-25-

(Utah 1985) are dispositive of the present case and should lead
this Court to grant the appellant a new trial.
In Chambers/ this Court stated:
In this case the trial court instructed
the jury that possession of recently
stolen property, in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation, is "prima
facie11 evidence of theft by the person
in possession of the property. Such
an instruction. . . fits within the
Franklin definition of a mandatory
rebuttable presumption: "A "[mandatory] rebuttable presumption. . .
requires the jury to find the element
unless the defendant persuades the
jury that such a finding is unwarranted." 105 S.Ct. at 1971, n.2.
We therefore hold that the instruction
given in this case was unconstitutional.
State v. Chambers, supra at 16 (followed in Stare v. Pacheco,
supra at 19).
In so ruling, this Court implicity found that giving the
instruction in question resulted in circumvention of the rule,
established in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 25 L.Ed. 2d 368,
374, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1074 (1970), that the due process clause
requires "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime. . . charged."

The rationale underlying

the Chambers ruling was also partly gleaned from this Court's
reading of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 61 L.Ed. 2d 39,
99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979), (where the Court ruled on the constitutionality of an instruction which read:

"[T]he law presumes that

a person intends the reasonable and ordinary consequences of his
own acts."):
-26-

In Sandstrom, the Supreme Court
reasoned that the jury could have
interpreted the presumption as
irrebuttable or alternatively as
requiring a high level of proof in
order to rebut the presumption,
thereby "effecitvely shifting -die
burden of persuasion, . . ".
State v. Chambers, supra at 16.
The Chambers ruling relied most directly upon the recent
United States Supreme Court case of Francis v. Franklin, 105 S.Ct.
1965,85 L.Ed. 2d 344 (1985):
Franklin extended the Sandstrom
decision and found that use of any
mandatory rebuttable presumption in
a jury instruction is unconstitutional.
A mandatory rebuttable presumption
. . . relieves the State of the
affirmative burden of persuasion on
the presumed element by instructing
the jury that it must find the presumed element unless the defendant
persuades the jury not to make such
a finding. A mandatory rebuttable
assumption is perhaps less onerous
[than an irrebuttable or conclusive
presumption] from the defendant's
perspective, but is no less unconstitutional .
Chambers, supra at 16 quoting Franklin, supra at 1972-1973.
The appellant in the present case contends that a mandatory rebuttable presumption arose when the trial court read
instruction 13 quoted above.
instruction identical

Because this case involves an

to the one found objectionable in Chambers,

this Court should grant the appellant a new trial.
It should be noted that the language in instruction 13
which follows the quotation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1) does
-27-

not cure the defect which arose from reading the statute.

As

this Court stated in Chambers, supra, at 16-17:
Although there was another instruction
given, instruction No. 25, which restated the presumption in permissive*
form, the additional instruction
failed to cure the defect. "Language
that merely contradicts and does not
explain a constitutionally infirm
instruction will not suffice to
absolve the infirmity. A reviewing
court has no way of knowing which of
the two irreconcilable instructions
the jurors applied in reaching their
verdict."
(Citation omitted.) Thus,
because the mandatory presumption in
question directly related to the
determination of defendant's guilt,
we hold that defendants are entitled
to a new trial.
It should also be noted that the non-statutory language
in instruction 13 informs the jury that the appellant could be
presumed guilty where the "defendant had made no satisfactory
explanation" of his possession of stolen property.

This language

suffers from the very infirmity which lies at the heart of the
objectionable stautory language.

The appellant should be granted

a new trial because "[a]n instruction which could reasonably be
understood to relieve the State of its burden of proof is constitutionally defective."

Chambers, supra at 17.
CONCLUSION

The court below erred in failing to grant the defendant's
motion to suppress evidence obtained during the improper parole
search of the defendant's residence.

The court committed further

serious error when it ruled that merely cumulative, other crimes
-28-

evidence pertaining to forgery counts severed from the trial
below could be admitted at trial.

Eclipsing the prejudice

caused by these two rulings, the court committed fundamental
error when it insisted upon reading the jury an unconstitutional
"possession of property recently stolen" instruction.

Because

of the highly prejudicial nature of the errors committed below,
the appellant requests that his conviction be reversed and that
his case be remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

day of January, 1986.

FRANCES M. PALACIOS
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Frances M. Palacios, hereby certify that four copies of
the foregoing Appellant!s Brief will be deliverd to the Attorney
Generalfs Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114, this

day of of January, 1986.

FRANCES M. PALACIOS
Attorney for Appellant

DELIVERED by

this

January, 1986.
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Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

: MOTION TO SUPPRESS
:
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:

PATRICK JOHNSON,

: Case No . ( Q R 8 5 ^ 2 ^

Defendant

:

The defendant through his counsel, KAREN JENNINGS, hereby
moves to suppress at trial items taken from the house in which
he was arrested on February 1&, 1985 because:
1.

They were seized in violation of his
right against unreasonable searches
and seizure.

2.

Counsel for the defendant was notified
of the existence of such items on Mav
6, 1985 and has tried without success
to get copies of said items for investigation nurposes. The County Attorney
was on May 6th, aware that counsel for
the defendant had a vacation scheduled
for Hay 9-17, 1985 and still has failed
and refused to make copies of said
items. A Discovery Order was signed
by this court on April 26, 1985.

DATED this

Q^
day of Fay, 1985
2*1
Respectfully submitted,
KAREN JENNINGS
^
Attorney for Defendant

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County, Utah

FRANCES M. PALACIOS (#25 02)
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOTION TO EXCLUDE

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
vs.

Case N tfs^CR 85-388.-and
^—Or-8-5^89
(Judge Billings)

PATRICK D. JOHNSON,
Defendant

The defendant, PATRICK D. JOHNSON, by and through his
attorney, FRANCES M. PALACIOS, hereby moves this Court in the
above-entitled action to exclude all evidence of crimes, wrongs,
or acts pursuant to 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.
DATED this c^f

day of May, 1985.

o

FRANCES M. PALACIOS
Attorney for Defendant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Motion to the Jimmy Gurule,
Deputy County Attorney, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111, this Z-l

day of May, 1985.
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FRANCES M. PALACIOS
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

LOKC

County, Ulni

JUL 17 1985
Cier\ ore ^«st Court
P^~ .tV HPfk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
vs.
PATRICK D. JOHNSON,

DEFENDANT'S APPLICATION FOR
CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
AND MOTION FOR STAY OF FURTHER
IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE PENDING
APPEAL
Case No. CR 85-388
(Judge Billings)

Defendant
Defendant, PATRICK D. JOHNSON, by and through his attorney
of record, hereby applies for a Certificate of Probable Cause
pursuant to Section 77-35-27, Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

Defendant bases this Application for Probable Cause

on the following meritorious issues arising from his trial and
subsequent conviction in case number CR 85-388.
1.

The trial court should have granted defendant's

motion to suppress on the grounds that the search was not
within the delineated purpose and policy of a parole search.
2.

The trial court should have granted defendant's

motion to exclude the alleged specific bad act of defendant
pursuant to Rule 404b, Utah Rules of Evidence.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UIAH

STATE OF UTAH,

vs

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

PATRICK D. JOHNSON,

Case No. CR 85-388

Plaintiff,

Honorable Judith Billings

Defendant.

On May 23, 1985, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence found
at the defendant's residence as the result of a parole search came before the
Court for hearing, the Honorable Judith M. Billings presiding.

The State of

Utah was represented by Jimmy Gurule1 , Deputy County Attorney, and the defendant
was represented by Counsel, Frances Palacios.
arguments were heard by the Court.

Testimony was given and oral

Being fully advised of the legal questions

at issue; having considered the proposed evidence; authorities of counsel and
arguments of counsel, the Court now enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
(1)

John Shepherd, an Agent with Utah State Adult Probation and Parole,

testified that on February 2, 1985, the defendant, PATRICK D. JOHNSON, was on
parole for the commission of a burglary, a third-degree felony.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
CR 85-388
Page 2
(2)

John Shepherd further testififed that on February 2, 1985, he spoke

with Detective Kyle Jones, Salt Lake City Police Department, who stated that a
formal information had been filed with the Court charging the defendant with
eight felony counts of Forgery.
(3)

Detective Jones stated that one of the forged checks was taken during

a burglary of the Four Square Church.

The other forged checks were made out on

the checking account of "Cary Montoya".
(4)

On February 2, 1985, John Shepherd accompanied Detective Jones to

the defendant's residence for the purpose of conducting a parole search in an
attempt to locate property and/or checks taken during the Four Square Church
burglary as well as other checks belonging to Cary Montoya.
(5)

During the search of the defendant's residence Agent John Shepherd

located a blank check on the account of Four Square Church and numerous papers
and receipts containing the name and/or signature of "Cary Montoya11 •
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, the Court now enters
its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(1)

That pursuant to Rule 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,

the Four Square Church check and the papers and receipts containing the name
and/or signature of Cary Montoya are probative on the issue of the identity of
the perpetrator of the burglary and the forgeries charged in the instant case.
(2)

As set forth in State v Velasquez,

P2d

(Utah 1983), Agent John

Shepherd had "reasonable suspicion" to conduct a parole search of the defendant's
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residence. Agent Shepherd had "reasonable suspicion" to believe the defendant
had camiitted a parole violation or other crime and further that contraband
would be located in his residence. The search was therefore reasonable and not
in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or
Article I, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution.
The Court having entered its Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters
its:
ORDER
The DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE IS DENIED.

DATED this

L4i

C

*°**~

day of AUGUST, 1985.

•4* J?-

/JcpITHi tf7
BILLINGS
tfTBILLIN
Third D i s t r i c t Court Jui

ATTEST
H. DIXON H»«OLr.Y

^Hy^W-^
Approved a s t o form:

2z

FFANCES^>ALACIOS
Counsel f o r Defendant

DwpUy Clark

